STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF CLAIMS

THE MOTION INVOLVES AND REQUESTS A RULING THAT A PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, A STATUTE, RULE OR REGULATION, OR OTHER STATE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION IS INVALID;

HELEN MOORE, ELENA HERRADA,
LAMAR LEMMONS, IDA SHORT,
TAWANNA SIMPSON, ALIYA MOORE
as next friend of the minor children
C.J. and T.M., DOROTHEA NICHOLSON as next
friend of the minors D.W. and A.W., SHERRY
LAWRENCE as next friend of the minor S.L.,
YOLANDA PEOPLES as next friend of the minor J.P.,
DAWN PAULING, as next friend of J.P., EILEENE
GORDON-KING as next friend of the minor A. G-T.,
all on their own behalf, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICK SNYDER, in his Official
Capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan,

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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DECLARATORY & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

ARGUMENT

I. PUBLIC ACTS 192-197 of 2016[1], or parts thereof, are local acts and, as such, required strict adherence to the requirements imposed by the state Constitution for passage.

Plaintiffs submit that the new acts, particularly PA. 192 of 2016[2], are local acts. Article IV, §29, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 prohibits the state from enacting local acts "until approved by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving" in both house of the state legislature and until approved "by a majority of the electors voting" in the affected district. The legislation was not approved by two-thirds of the members elected and serving in the state legislature, nor was it approved by a majority of the electors voting in the affected district; to wit, the city of Detroit. The STATEMENT OF FACTS AND EXHIBITS appended to this Brief set forth a sufficient legal and factual basis to justify the relief sought from this court.

The city of Detroit is a local government and its local laws and ordnances adopted by local electors, and ordinances, adopted by local legislative bodies, are local laws – equivalent to local acts adopted by the state legislature. The government of Detroit is run by a mayor, the nine-member Detroit City Council, and a clerk elected on a nonpartisan ballot. The Detroit Public

[1] Exhibits 1-6
[2] Exhibit 1

Schools district is totally defined geographically by the limits of the city of Detroit and the Board of Education of the DPS, consisting of eleven members, is elected by electors of the city of Detroit.

A. PUBLIC ACTS 192-197 of 2016 as passed by the legislature apply only to the DPS and no other school district.

The laws will take effect on July 1, 2016 (except for HB5387, now Public Act 194 (2016)). P.A. 192 (2016) formerly HB5384 contains most of the unconstitutional provisions of the laws. As stated in the laws, "'Transfer Date' means the first July 1 after the date a school district becomes a qualifying school district. For a school district that became a qualifying school district on the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subdivision, the transfer date is July 1, 2016." (Exhibit 8). Instead of specifically naming DPS, the rubric of 'qualifying school district' is employed in the law throughout the lengthy bills apparently to make it appear that they are not local laws. The definitions as provided within P.A. 192 (2016), HB 5384 makes it clear that only one school district in the state, the DPS, can and does meet the definition of the oft-mentioned "qualifying school district."

P.A. 192 (2016) formerly HB5384 contains the language that defines the meaning of 'qualifying school district' as the local Detroit Public Schools district. Whenever and wherever the term "qualifying school district" appears in the Law, it means the Detroit Public Schools, as defined by the language of the law itself and cannot possibly apply to any of the state's other 549 public school districts. The definition of "qualifying school district" is set forth in section 3 (9) of HB 5384, P.A. 192(2016):

> "[Q]ualifying school district means a school district that was previously organized and operated as a first class school district . . . including, but not limited to, a school district that was previously organized and operated as a first class school district before the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subsection. . . .(Exhibit 9). (Emphasis added).

The Detroit Public Schools is the only school district in the state of Michigan that "was" a first class school district and is the only school district in the state that will be a first class district on July 1, 2016.under the definition as set forth in P.A. 192. There is no possibility whatsoever that any other school district in the state could meet this definition given the transition date of July 1, 2016. because no other school district in the state 'was' a first class district at that time, and no other school district has ever been a first class school district in the history of state education. The specific use of the language "was previously organized and operated" can only mean events that have already occurred in the past. "Was" is the past tense of 'is" and must be attributed its plain and unambiguous meaning.

Sec. 395 of the P.A. 192 (2016) (Exhibit 10) also describes and specifies that the term "qualifying school district" can only be applied to the Detroit Public Schools and no other school district in the state of Michigan;

Under Sec. 395 (1) "If a qualifying school district is a party to a lease between the qualifying school district and an achievement authority, the community district shall not renew or extend the lease after June 30 following the transfer date." Under Sec. 395(2) "If a qualifying school district is a party to an interlocal agreement with a state public university creating an achievement authority, as soon as possible after the transfer date the

community district shall take action to withdraw from that interlocal agreement to the extent permitted under that interlocal agreement." Under Sec. 395(3) "If a qualifying school district is a party to an interlocal agreement with a state public university creating an achievement authority, the community district is not authorized to jointly exercise any powers, privileges, or authorities under that interlocal agreement after the[sic] June 30 following the transfer date." Under Sec. 395(4) "As used in this section, "Achievement Authority" means that term as defined in section 3 of the State School Aid Act of 1979, MCL 388.1603."

Section 3 of MCL 388.1603 (Exhibit 11) defines "Achievement Authority" as follows;

"Achievement authority" means the education achievement authority, the public body corporate and special authority initially created under section 5 of article III and section 28 of article VII of the state constitution of 1963 and the urban cooperation act of 1967, 1967 (Ex Sess) PA 7, MCL 124.501 to 124.512, by an interlocal agreement effective August 11, 2011, between the **school district of the city of Detroit** and the board of regents of Eastern Michigan university, a state public university. (Emphasis added).

As no other school district in the state of Michigan has ever used the name 'school district of the city of Detroit' and no other school district in the state of Michigan presently uses the name 'school district of Detroit,' the School District of Detroit is the only school district in the state that meets the definition of a "qualifying school district." as that term is defined by (2016) P.A.192 and specifically Sec. 395 of P.A. 192 (2016) and Section 3 of MCL 388.1603.

Other areas of the law also provide additional information reinforcing the logical conclusion that the only school district the Laws are about is the local Detroit Public Schools district;

"School district of the first class", "first class school district", and "district of the first class" mean, for the purposes of this article only, a district that had at least 40,000 pupils in membership for the immediately preceding fiscal year. (Exhibit). The word "had", like "was" is a word indicating something that has occurred in the past and cannot be used to define something that might possibly happen in the future.

The Detroit Public Schools has been and is still the only first class school district in the state that "had" a pupil membership of less than 100,000 enrolled on its most recent pupil membership count day (DPS had 46,000) , , , (HB-5384 depicts July 1, 2016 as date of the 'amendatory act' of the new law. This definition applies only to the Detroit Public Schools as no other school district in the state meets the definition of being a 'qualifying school district" as mandated by these various requirements.

B. Because the law as passed by the legislature applies only to the DPS and as the DPS is a local district, the law is a local act.

The Michigan Supreme Court has described the assumptions that must be brought to bear in the determination of whether an act is local or general;

> In Dearborn v Bd of Supervisors, 275 Mich 151, 155-156, 157 (1936), this Court established a two-part test for determining whether an act is general or local. First, the limiting criteria of the act must be reasonably related to the overall purpose of the statute. Second, the act must be sufficiently open-ended so that localities may be brought within the scope of its provisions as such localities over time meet the

required criteria. “The probability or improbability of other [localities] reaching the statutory [criteria] . . . is not the test of a general law.” “It must be assumed” that other localities may come to meet the criteria. Id. at 157.

1. The limiting criteria of the act must be reasonably related to the overall purpose of the statute.

The stated purpose of the Law is clearly set forth in the SENATE SUMMARY of HB5384;

> The following is a brief description of legislation that would transfer the Detroit Public Schools to a new district, and make related changes.
>
> As used in this summary, "qualifying school district" refers to the "old" Detroit Public Schools (DPS), which would remain in existence only for the purposes of levying mills to pay off debt. "Community district" means the "new" district established to continue all rights, functions, and responsibilities of educating children, with the exception of paying off old operating debt.

The “overall purpose” of the statute of the legislation are reflected in the comments of Jeff Hansen, the Senator who fashioned a bi-partisan package of bills that was totally ignored by the House. Senator Hansen’s statement, in which Senator Hertel concurred, is as follows:

> I stand before this body to do what is normally statistically impossible—give a “no” vote explanation on legislation that

I championed. That's a first for me, to say the least. But these are the circumstances where I have found myself. Every day for the past year, I have focused 100 percent of my energies on a package of bills that were intended to forge a new path forward for the future of Detroit Public Schools.

As I told the House of Appropriations Committee last month, after months of intense negotiation, it was truly a blessing for Democrats and Republicans in this chamber to partner together and agree on a compromise education reform plan. It was a bipartisan commitment to improving the educational future for the children of Detroit.

It was a plan that created a new community school district, separate from the old DPS and free of debt. It addressed the multitude of financial difficulties facing the district. It maintained educational choice and improved choice options for parents and students; avoided a lengthy and costly bankruptcy; returned local control to an elected school board; provided oversight of taxpayer dollars; and managed the opening of new schools so that all areas of the Detroit community would have access to quality school options.

Unfortunately, many critical elements necessary for real educational success in this district were not included in the bill that just came before us from the other chamber. It's been characterized that this compromise bill represents a proverbial three-fourths of a loaf of bread and that we

should accept paying down the district's debt and returning elected control as acceptable outcomes only. Why should Detroit children accept anything that's less than what other children across this state are receiving? Why should Detroit children accept only three-fourths of our effort and not fix this problem once and for all?

Unfortunately, this bill provides a continued path that will pit DPS and charter schools against each other. Rather, we should be focused on creating an environment where good schools of all types have an opportunity to flourish and provide the educational services our children truly deserve. Instead, let's have a standard that holds everyone accountable and improves the quality of education. There are lots of choices for schools in Detroit, but these parents and children need to have quality choices.

My fear is that the serious lack of coordination related to school site planning decisions will continue. By not truly fixing these systemic problems, are we not furthering the confusion and chaos that negatively impacts parents' ability to seek stability and positive educational options for their children? I was encouraged that the legislation which initially passed this chamber would have brought about a new level of coordination, increased parental choice, and attract new education options for students.

The changes made to these bills, however, are not anchored in a way that will truly lead to academic improvement.

There needed to be a real accountability system that would drive the academic outcomes we all expect.

All of us were elected to solve problems. Some problems are being solved here today, and others are being left unresolved to the detriment of Michigan taxpayers. I fear that a prime opportunity for real achievement has been missed.

I am a proud Republican from West Michigan, representing the fine people of the 34th Senate District, who also stands with the children and parents of Detroit. I will continue working with the fine leaders of this community to make sure the progress they have made in Detroit is not made in vain. Michigan will not reach its full potential until there's a healthy, vibrant Detroit. This work will never be complete without a stable educational community, which is necessary in order to ensure the revitalization of this city.

I'm honored to have had the opportunity to work alongside all of my colleagues in this chamber, as well as many passionate advocates across the state. Thank you to all of the stakeholders and interest groups who joined our initial efforts and put your reputations on the line. This was a just and honest cause.

Unfortunately, I was unable to support this bill, and it pains me greatly to say that. However, I will continue to work in a bipartisan way to ensure that Detroit families have the same strong, thriving education options as seen in

other school districts across the great state of Michigan." (Emphasis added)(Exhibit).

2. The act must be sufficiently open-ended so that localities may be brought within the scope of its provisions as such localities over time meet the required criteria.

Houston, supra at ___, holds that in assessing a law's generality, it must be "assumed" that other "localities may come to meet the criteria." Here, such an "assumption" that any other school district could possibly meet the criteria of having the name 'school district of the city of Detroit' and an interlocal agreement with Eastern Michigan University and be a "qualifying school district . . . that "was" previously organized and operated as a first class school district . . . including, but not limited to, a school district that "was" previously organized and operated as a first class school district before the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subsection. . . would not only be improbable, but impossible on its face. (Exhibit 9) (Emphasis added). To "assume . . . that other localities may come to meet the criteria" in this situation, or any other situation, would render the terms of any law meaningless if an impossibility is included within the penumbra of such an assumption. If the test for generality of a law is that 'everything is possible', there would never be and could never be such a thing as a local act being passed by the legislature. There would be no need for a local act provision in the Michigan Constitution because there would be no need for one. With such an "open-ended" approach, the legislature would be free to do whatever it wanted in foisting its will and power on singular localities throughout the state. But not presently. Plainly put, there is no other school district in the state of Michigan that "was" a first class school district on the amendatory date of the statute (July 1, 2016) and that is a party to the interlocal

agreement between the school district of the city of Detroit and Eastern Michigan University. The reason that no other school district could possibly be encompassed within the scope of the statute is not simply because of the July 1, 2016 amendatory act date alone, but because no school district, other than the school district of the city of Detroit, "was" a first class school district on that date and a party mentioned by its specific name, the school district of the city of Detroit, to the mentioned interlocal agreement with Eastern Michigan University. Stated in the most succinct terms, it is impossible for any other school district in the state of Michigan to ever meet the definition, as set forth by the legislature, of the specific "qualifying school district." There is no "open-ended" aspect to the legislature because of this impossibility.

C. The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature from the plain language of the statute.

This court should consider the plain and unambiguous language of the act. The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature from the plain language of the statute. Lash v. Traverse City, 479 Mich. 180, 186-187, 735 N.W.2d 628 (2007). Plaintiffs incorporate the detailed language of the legislation as set forth, supra, in Sec. A by reference thereto. The plain language of the statute uses "was" on two occasions and "had" once when defining a "local qualifying district," as set forth in the preceding section. "Was" and "had" are words of past tense and must be attributed their plain and unambiguous meaning as used by the legislature in defining "qualifying school district." Here the plain

and unambiguous language includes the words and phrases "was," "had," "was previously organized and operated as a first class school district," and "school district of the city of Detroit." The future tense of was would be 'will be.' The present tense of was would be 'is." The "school district of the city of Detroit" means only the "school district of the city of Detroit."

The additional factor as to the local nature of the acts under consideration goes further than the fact that no other school district can meet the definition of a past "qualifying school district by July 1, 2016. Sec. 395 of the Law which describes the "interlocal agreement effective August 11, 2011, between the school district of the city of Detroit and the board of regents of Eastern Michigan university, a state public university." (Emphasis added). Thus, it is obvious that the "qualifying school district" was meant by the legislature to mean the local DPS and no other school district.

D. The Law is a local act and is in violation of Article IV, §29, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 that prohibits the state from enacting local acts "until approved by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving" in both house of the state legislature and until approved "by a majority of the electors voting" in the affected district.

These requirements have not been met and the Law is null and void on its face. Alternatively, P.A. 192 of 2016 is null and void on its face. The language of the Acts used by the Legislature is plain and unambiguous. As of July 1, 2016, the local Detroit Public Schools is the only school district in the state fitting the definition of 'qualifying school district.' The legislature clearly intended to confine the law to have applicability to the Detroit Public Schools

alone as indicated by its reference within the Act to the "interlocal agreement effective August 11, 2011, between the school district of the city of Detroit and the board of regents of Eastern Michigan university, a state public university," as well as its past tense qualifying language "was" and "had." While obvious on its face, it needs to be stated quite clearly that the only school district with the title "school district of the city of Detroit" is the DPS. Thus, the local nature of the Acts required a 2/3 vote of approval from each house as well as Detroit voter approval. Those requirements were not met.

Thus, the instant situation is clearly distinguishable from Houston in that both the intent and the specificity of the law was for it to affect only DPS and no other school district in the state, now or ever in the future. Accordingly, construction is neither necessary nor permitted, and the provisions must be enforced as written. As such, in making the determination of whether or not the Act is a local act ("whether a general act can be made applicable shall be a judicial question") only one conclusion can be drawn; The new law is applicable only to the DPS, and, thus, constitutes a local act that is subject to the constitutional limitations set forth in Const. 1963, Art. IV, §29, Because the methods of enactment have been disregarded by the legislature, the laws should be declared null and void until such time as both houses of the legislature may approve it by two-thirds majority vote and local electors approve passage of the law.

I. The Laws create an inherently unequal and separate educational system in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution and the due process clause of the State Constitution (article 1, § 2).

In Sullivan v. Graham, 336 Mich. 65, 72; 57 N.W.2d 447 (1953) the court stated;

> "The fact that a rule of law may in certain instances work a hardship does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution, provided it operates without any discrimination and in like manner against all persons of a class." Peoples Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 281, 282 (69 ALR 1024). (Italics supplied.) . . . The act in question in the instant case, clearly and unjustly discriminates in favor of trustees, banks, trust companies, building and loan associations and savings and loan associations, as against all other persons in the same class doing residential building operations. The corporations mentioned in section 4 (g) are entirely exempted from obtaining a license before they build on any property to which they hold title or have an equitable title or in which they have a financial interest, a very important discrimination in favor of such corporations. The statute in question in the instant case violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution and the due process clause of our State Constitution (article 2, § 16 (1908)), (now replaced by article 1, section 2)(1963)."

The principle at stake in the instant case is exactly analogous to Sullivan v. Graham, supra. The school children of the entire state of Michigan constitute a specific and well-defined class. Until such time as this draconian provision may be put into place, this entire class of students is required to be taught by properly-trained certified teachers. DPS children, a group of children isolated and singled out by the new laws, are part of that class. By way of example, a child living on the Detroit side of Eight Mile road is treated by the provisions of P.A. 192 of 2016 differently than a child living on the Ferndale, Eastpointe or Grosse Pointe sides of the road. The law under attack is not facially neutral. The law, P.A. 192 of 2016, seeks to treat DPS children differently than the rest of the class by allowing uncertified persons into their classrooms ostensibly to 'teach' them, while no other school district in the state, in adjacent urban districts or remote northern Michigan districts, can legally

permit such use of uncertified persons, a "very important discrimination in favor of . .." non-DPS state-wide students. the legislature has gone out of its way to change long-standing state law requiring certified teachers for all students in the state (Exhibit) to banish this requirement only for the public school children of Detroit. Interim superintendent Alycia Meriweather says the loophole is like "letting an untrained pilot fly a plane. The whole country would be outraged if a pilot took off a plane with people on board, and they had no training. We have 46,000 passengers whose life is in our hand,." Meriweather said, "We need the most qualified, most certified, best people teaching our kids."

There is no rational basis for this legislative action whatsoever. Students of certified teachers perform better than students of uncertified tteachers. Moreover, there is a large body of research that clearly shows that the number of certified teachers in a state is a strong and consistent indicator of higher student achievement gains. The key factor that sets certified teachers apart from other teachers is their training in teaching methods and in child and adolescent development, in addition to content knowledge. According to a 1996 study by Greenwald, Hedges and Laine, teachers with pedagogical training performed better than those who entered teaching without such training. (Exhibit 15) In a 2009 study by Easton-Brooks and Davis, teacher certification accounted for 8% of the growth in reading achievement and was particularly influential in predicting growth for African American students. They concluded that having fully certified teachers helped to narrow the academic gap between African American and European American students across early elementary grades. (Education Policy Analysis Archives, 17 (15)) (Exhibit 16). Esteemed educator Linda Darling-Hammond and colleagues used regression analysis to investigate the

relationship between teacher certification and student achievement over a six-year period. They found that certified teachers consistently produced stronger student achievement gains than uncertified teachers. (Education Policy Analysis Archives, 13 (42)).(Exhibit 17) Laczko-Kerr and Berliner compared achievement of students taught by certified teachers with those taught by uncertified teachers and found that students with certified teachers outperformed the other students across all three subtests of the Stanford Achievement Test. They concluded that students taught by uncertified teachers paid a penalty in academic growth for their teacher's lack of training, stating that uncertified teachers actually "do harm." ("In Harms Way: How Uncertified Teachers Hurt Their Students," Educational Leadership (May): 34-39).(Exhibit 18).

Senator Geoffrey Hansen appropriately pointed out the problem in his post-passage comments; "Why should Detroit children accept anything that's less than what other children across this state are receiving? Why should Detroit children accept only three-fourths of our effort and not fix this problem once and for all?" (Exhibit ?)

As set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, "In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit". Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).

The importance of education to a democratic society was addressed in Plyer: [N]either is [education] merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting

impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. The "American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance. We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government," and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on which our society rests." "[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. And these historic "perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a political system manager have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists." In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests. Ibid, at 221 (citations and quotations omitted).

The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that an individual will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. US CONST amend V. Furthermore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, no one may be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" nor be denied equal protection of the laws. US CONST amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Michigan Constitution ensures: No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. Mich. Const (1963), art I, §17. 997). These constitutional provisions serve to protect citizens, including DPS children, from being deprived of laws that "operate[s] without any discrimination and in like manner against all persons of a class."

Sullivan v Graham, supra at 75. Rights specifically identified in the Constitution or principles of justice are so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental and therefore implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721.

It is respectfully submitted that education is one of these "principles." The Michigan Constitution specifically notes the importance of education to a well-ordered society: "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." MICH CONST (1963), art I, §1. As such, "The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin." MICH CONST (1963), art I, §2.

This obligation of the state to provide a system of free public education includes statewide a minimum statutory requirement that all teachers be certified, except for the new proposed community school district. The question must be asked (and it is respectfully suggested that it is incapable of being logically answered); Under what rationale, at any level of understanding, can it be possibly justified by the legislature in taking the lowest performing school district of the 549 school districts in the state and establish a statutory criteria for the use of non-certified and non-licensed teachers in that district alone? Denying every child of the DPS what every other child in the entire state enjoys (the statutory right to be taught by a properly-certified teacher) violates equal protection and substantive due process because it is not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, has no rational basis whatsoever, and establishes a system that is fundamentally unfair.

WHEREFORE, for all the reasons as stated herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court;

1. Issue an order rendering Public Acts 192-197 of 2016 null and void, or in the alternative, a declaratory order rendering portions of said acts, such as P. A. 192 of 2016, null and void as constituting a local act within the meaning of Art 4, sec.29 of the Michigan constitution and,
2. An order rendering Public Acts 192-197 of 2016 null and void, or in the alternative, a declaratory order rendering such portions of said acts, such as P. A. 192 of 2016, null and void as being in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution and the due process clause of the State Constitution (article 1, § 2) and,
3. An order temporarily restraining and enjoining Defendant Snyder from taking any executive action toward implementation of Public Acts 192-197 of 2016 and,
4. An order requiring Defendant to show cause why such injunctive and/or declaratory relief should not be made permanent and,
5. An order for an immediate show cause hearing requiring Defendant to show cause why such injunctive and/or declaratory relief should not be made permanent and,
6. An order granting such further relief as the court may deem appropriate.

Respcetfully submitted,

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